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Abstract: Since the introduction of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) by 
telecommunication network operators, national regulators have begun to adapt their 
access regulation regimes to the new technological conditions. The regulatory reactions 
gravitate towards three distinct regulatory trajectories: unregulated competition, access 
regulation, and structural separation. We first analyze the extent of market power in 
access Networks in NGNs from a technological perspective. Second, we use case studies 
to identify patterns between technological and market conditions and regulators' reactions 
in selected countries. We find that market power in the access network is likely to prevail. 
Regulatory reactions differ with the extent of infrastructure competition and the regulators 
position in the trade-off between promoting investment and protecting competition 
Key words: Next Generation Network, deregulation, access regulation, structural 
separation. 
 
he move towards Next Generation Networks (NGNs) has begun to 
transform the telecommunication sector from vertically distinct, 
single-service markets into horizontal, converging multi-service 
markets. The core of an NGN is a software platform (the IP Multimedia 
Subsystem) that uses the standardized Internet Protocol (IP) to enable the 
provision of any service, e.g., data, voice, or video, via any physical network 
infrastructure, e.g., wireline (copper or fiber) or wireless facilities. The 
platform thus uncouples the classic relationship between infrastructure and 
services and facilitates technological convergence. From a techno-
economical point of view (1) convergence increases the substitutability of 
                     
(*) The authors thank Andreas Brenck, Achim Czerny, Johannes Fuhr, Scott Marcus, Kay 
Mitusch, Stephan Steglich, and two anonymous referees for their comments. Any remaining 
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network infrastructures, and (2) the disintegration and IP-based horizontal 
layering of the network reduces economies of scope between infrastructure 
and service provisioning. Both effects support infrastructure competition in 
the access networks. Furthermore, (3) since NGNs provide customers 
access to a wider range of services over their selected access network, the 
bandwidth demand increases to levels equal to or greater than the demand 
in the specific legacy networks. Thus, many operators upgrade their access 
networks 1 when introducing NGNs. 
National regulators face the question of how to adapt their current access 
regulation regimes to this changing competitive and dynamic environment in 
which many incumbents have announced or begun the migration to NGN as 
well as the rollout of optical high-speed access networks. We observe three 
emerging regulatory trajectories: (1) unregulated competition, (2) access 
regulation of integrated companies, and (3) structural separation. As these 
trajectories span a wide range of regulatory options, we first ask whether 
market power justifying regulation persists in NGNs. Second, we search for 
patterns in the technological, market, and institutional conditions affecting 
the path choice of national regulators.  
Pending infrastructure investments in many countries have brought 
issues of regulation and investment to center stage in the literature on 
access network regulation. DE BIJL & PEITZ (2007) provide a variance 
analysis of regulatory regimes in the light of investment incentives. They 
argue in favor of light-handed regulation and note that wholesale access 
regulation may no longer be appropriate. TARDIFF (2007) assesses the 
impact of convergence on retail prices in the US broadband sector and 
argues that the intramodal competition renders retail price regulation 
unnecessary. BAAKE et al. (2007) provide an extensive analysis of 
regulation in dynamic markets, and reason that deregulation is only feasible 
if convergence leads to a high substitutability of networks. They further 
argue in favor of regulatory holidays for new networks to protect investment. 
Furthermore, GUTHRIE (2006) provides a literature review on regulation and 
investment. The academic literature is supplemented by regulatory inquiries 
on the national level, e.g., Ofcom (2007) and OPTA (2006c) and supra-
national level, e.g. ERG (2007a)  that provide insight into the market analysis 
process and regulatory decision-making. 
                     
1 The term "Next Generation Access Network" refers to broadband access networks. We 
include all access network technologies in our analysis and therefore refer to "access networks 
in NGNs". 
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In this paper, we first provide a technology-centered analysis of the 
impacts of NGNs on market definition and on market power in access 
networks. We argue that despite convergence, high-speed network 
operators may, under certain conditions, retain market power, although less 
power than legacy networks. Second, we use country case studies 
exemplifying the three aforementioned regulatory trajectories to identify 
patterns in technological, market, and institutional conditions that can help 
explain national regulators' choices. We find two regulatory patterns: one 
that focuses on promoting specific investments, e.g., in the Republic of 
Korea and the USA, and one that focuses on protecting competition, e.g., in 
the Netherlands and the UK. 
  Market power in access networks in NGNs  
In the past, residential wireline telephony access networks were a 
textbook example of monopolistic bottlenecks. With the advent of NGNs, 
economists began to challenge this view, as convergence sparked the hope 
for infrastructure competition in the local loop (WEY et al., 2006). However, 
this issue has been debated intensely in the context of fiber network rollouts,  
e.g., in Germany and the Netherlands (WAR, 2005; OPTA, 2006a).  
We analyze the extent of market power in access networks in NGNs from 
a technical perspective. We examine the impact of convergence on the 
market definition of infrastructure services and discuss the potential for 
infrastructure competition. We assert that infrastructure services are 
changing from integrated services such as telephony to "unbundled" 
transport services that complement applications such as voice, TV, or 
Internet. Based on this definition, we propose two market scenarios for these 
infrastructure services, the first with a single, vertically differentiated market 
comprising all access technologies, and the second with two markets for 
"normal-speed" and "high-speed" networks. We argue that multiple networks 
of the same type remain largely inefficient, except where existing 
infrastructure can be upgraded. This renders multiple high-speed optical 
networks unlikely. However, infrastructure competition among normal-speed 
networks seems possible and may also limit the market power of high-speed 
networks.  
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Technological background of NGNs 
The NGN concept stems from the world of network operators. NGNs 
integrate classical telecommunication networks and the Internet, which has 
become a communication service platform competing head-to-head with 
long-established communication networks. One ingredient in the Internet's 
success is its flexibility, which comes from the separation of transport and 
service. This separation enables network convergence, i.e., the integration 
of networks, sub-networks, devices, and services into a "network of 
networks" using a common set of rules and a single language – the Internet 
Protocol (IP). In contrast to the Internet, classic communication networks are 
tightly controlled by network operators, vertically integrated, and designed 
for specific applications such as telephony. The NGN, as defined in ITU-T 
(2007), is an abstract concept for networks that incorporate the Internet's 
horizontal layering principles and technologies with the centralized control of 
conventional telecommunication networks and are provided as software by 
the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). A detailed technological discussion is 
presented by ELIXMANN & SCHIMMEL (2003) and POIKSELKA et al. 
(2005). The horizontal structure makes services agnostic to the access 
network technology, while the service delivery and platform control (SDPC), 
i.e., the IMS, integrates the different access and backbone infrastructures as 
shown in Figure 1. Therefore, any IP service that is made available on an 
NGN service platform, e.g., IPTV, VoIP, e-mail, WWW, etc., can be 
delivered over any IP-enabled access network, e.g., DSL, cable TV, WLAN, 
UMTS, etc., that is connected to the NGN. The basic idea shown in Figure 1 
also holds for the more likely case that multiple NGNs will emerge. However, 
as NGNs build on the simple and standardized IP, any service can be 
provided effortlessly on any competing NGN. 
Figure 1 - Architectural change through the migration to NGN 
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Thus, the effects of the migration to NGNs are twofold. First, the demand-
side and supply-side substitutability of different access infrastructures 
increases through convergence. Second, the standardized IP introduces a 
predetermined breaking point between infrastructure services and 
application services that greatly reduces economies of scope compared to 
the integrated and partly proprietary legacy networks. Third, a customer 
needs only a single converged access network to access any service. If a 
customer meets his demand on a single network, e.g., with a triple-play 
product, the bandwidth demand for that network will increase. As the access 
network marks the bandwidth bottleneck, the migration to NGN may require 
infrastructure upgrades to provide sufficient service quality. This is one 
reason for the large infrastructure investments in fiber networks that 
accompany the introduction of NGNs. 
Effects of NGNs on market definition 
Access networks in NGN no longer provide integrated transmission and 
service but unbundled physical transmission capacity and management for 
packet-based transmission: thus, IP connectivity serves as a complement for 
IP services. Service bundles such as triple-play - i.e. IP connectivity, 
telephony, and television - increase value for the customer, but on the 
supply side, the individual services can be unbundled or offered by third 
parties since the standardized IP reduces economies of scope between 
services and infrastructure. However, the access technologies differ in their 
capability to provide high-quality IP connectivity, i.e. bandwidth. Optical fiber 
networks currently provide the highest bandwidth, followed by cable TV, 
DSL, and wireless networks.  
The market for IP connectivity can be delimited by the three dimensions; 
demand substitution, supply substitution, and potential competition (BAKER, 
2007). From the demand perspective, IP connectivity presents an upstream 
product that enables the consumption of downstream application services. 
These downstream services can be divided by bandwidth requirements into 
normal-speed services including web browsing, e-mail, music downloads, 
etc. (up to about 3 to 5 MBit/s) and high-speed services including IPTV, 
video conferencing, etc. (over 10 MBit/s). While most network operators 
provide services that are sufficient for normal-speed transmission (high-
speed services are accessible with a delay or reduction in quality), so far, 
only optical and hybrid network operators provide suitable offers for both, 
normal and high-speed services. Thus, demand substitutability of access 
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technologies is expected to be high for users of normal-speed services and 
low for users of high-speed services. From the supply perspective, the 
substitutability is de facto limited by the capabilities of the network 
technologies. Currently, only optical and hybrid networks have the 
capabilities to provide sufficient bandwidth for high-speed services, while all 
networks are suitable for normal-speed services. Thus, supply 
substitutability is low for the high-speed segment, because normal-speed 
network operators have difficulties upgrading their current networks to 
provide higher speeds.  
However, technological advances can be observed in a number of 
networks that may enhance bandwidth and thus increase supply-side 
substitutability, while advances in data encoding, for example, reduce the 
bandwidth demand of some applications and increase demand-side 
substitutability. We will consider both the single-market and the two-market 
scenario in the following discussion. 
Market failure in access networks in NGNs 
In the classic communication networks, the indivisibility of access 
networks results in deviation from the competitive model, and thus, in market 
failure. In NGNs, infrastructure-based entry into the local loop can occur in 
two ways: by constructing new networks or upgrading existing networks. 
NGNs do not affect the deployment cost of new wireline infrastructures. 
First, these infrastructures remain subject to significant economies of scale 
as their deployment requires large, sunk investments e.g. for equipment and 
civil engineering. For an exemplary cost model of the German fiber to the 
cabinet (VDSL) network, see ILLIC & KULENKAMPFF (2007). Second, 
property-owners will likely  not allow operators to duplicate the last network 
section on the premise / indoors (ARCEP, 2006). The plans by three French 
operators to rollout parallel fiber infrastructures to the homes is an example 
for this issue (ERG, 2007b). Therefore, the construction of parallel 
infrastructures that are similar in costs and capabilities remains unlikely in 
NGNs, with the exception of low-cost wireless networks. One may even go 
as far as to say that infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV is 
a historic coincidence. However, providers can enter the market successfully 
by deploying a superior network with lower costs and/or higher quality 
alongside an existing infrastructure. Furthermore, existing networks from 
other domains, such as cable TV or powerline infrastructures, can be 
upgraded to provide bidirectional IP transmission. With the infrastructure 
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already in place, these upgrades affect only management hardware such as 
routers and therefore cost less than creating new infrastructure. A third 
possible exception are preinstalled fiber networks in large apartment 
complexes, e.g., in the Republic of  Korea (REYNOLDS et al., 2005).  
We argued that constructing new parallel infrastructures is unlikely. 
Except in regions under development, one or more access technologies are 
usually already available, e.g., DSL, cable TV, or mobile networks. In the 
following, we discuss the development of market power in multiple static 
networks for the two aforementioned market scenarios.  
n a single market, potential infrastructure competition exists where multiple 
networks are available at the same location. Depending on the available 
transmission capacities, consumers can identify quality differences between 
infrastructures such as time needed to load websites or download movies. 
Thus, besides the price differences, the infrastructures are vertically 
differentiated by bandwidth, i.e. quality. However, under this vertical product 
differentiation, customers will tend towards higher-quality products when the 
price difference between high-quality and low-quality products is sufficiently 
low (SHAKED & SUTTON, 1982). This enables the operator of the highest-
quality network to strategically use aggressive or even predatory pricing to 
gain a dominant market position. Low marginal costs allow the necessary 
pricing flexibility. The operator remains in this quasi-monopoly position until 
a competitor can deploy a superior network technology, which remains very 
difficult. However, as long as competitive infrastructures stay in the market, 
vertical product differentiation limits the ability of the quasi-monopolist to 
capture monopoly rents, depending on the quality gap between the 
infrastructures. 
n the two-market scenario, existing infrastructures compete only in their 
respective quality domain. The normal-speed market can be served by 
most access technologies including wireless infrastructures. An increase in 
bandwidth does not add value for these services, e.g., audio streaming or 
text-only website accessibility. Therefore, infrastructure competition between 
a limited number of networks may be sustainable in this market depending 
on the population density. If multiple infrastructures, e.g., cable TV, operate 
in the high-speed market, the vertical product differentiation argumentation 
from the first case applies. An example of this two-market reasoning can be 
found in the Netherlands, where the regulator distinguishes between 
unregulated low-quality wholesale bitstream access and regulated high-
speed bitstream access (OPTA, 2006c). 
I 
I 
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Thus we conclude that high-speed access network providers are likely 
retain market power, however limited by convergence. At the current state of 
technology, it appears that only the normal-speed market allows sustainable 
infrastructure competition, while a single or high-speed market leaves high-
quality network operators some leeway to act strategically and acquire a 
dominant market position through aggressive pricing or similar strategies. In 
this technical discussion, we have considered the factor of population 
density only implicitly and assumed it to be ideal, i.e., high. Decreasing 
population density, which would be considered in a geographic market 
analysis, amplifies the results of our arguments.  
  Regulatory options for access networks in NGN 
The sector-specific policy options to address market power in access 
networks apply to other network industries as well: access and price 
(de)regulation and structural measures such as different degrees of 
operational separation (CAVE, 2006). These options affect downstream 
competition but also the level of innovation or investment in the regulated 
market. Regulation aims to increase allocative market efficiency and 
addresses the distribution of rents, while structural measures target the 
problem of price and non-price discrimination between an integrated 
monopolist and its competitors. However, strict regulation (or fierce 
competition) but also a permanent monopoly, reduce investment incentives. 
Along with the introduction of NGNs, operators plan or undertake large 
asset-specific investments in high-speed infrastructure, which we argued to 
exhibit market power. Thus, regulatory policy has to balance static efficiency 
on the basis of existing competition and overall industry investment as new 
networks are built in the transition phase to full NGNs. Theoretical 
discussion of this relationship is provided by GURTHRIE (2006) and BAAKE 
et al.(2007). In the following, we discuss the impacts of access 
(de)regulation and structural measures on access networks in NGNs. 
The two main options for access regulation are either (1) temporary or 
permanent deregulation, i.e., the removal of sector-specific rules and 
regulations, or (2) mandated access, i.e., the obligation to grant access to 
bottleneck facilities at regulated price and quality. Deregulation increases 
investment incentives as it overcomes the "truncating problem" and allows 
above-normal profits (GANS & KING, 2003). However, under limited 
competition or threat of entry into the upstream market - that is, in the 
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absence of alternative infrastructures or in areas of low population density - 
an integrated incumbent may leverage its market power to competitive 
downstream segments. We conclude that deregulation in NGNs may be 
applicable in competitive normal-speed markets. On high-speed markets, 
deregulation spurs investment but operators' market power is likely to 
increase market concentration in the long run. Access holidays could 
address this issue. However, deviations from the optimal length will 
negatively impact either investment incentives or competition. Mandated 
access to the bitstream or the unbundled line reduces uncertainty and 
protects competition in the downstream market while the effects on 
investment depend on the allowed margin. Furthermore, regulated access to 
cable ducts can help competitors to deploy, restructure, or upgrade their 
access infrastructure. In NGNs, physical unbundling becomes increasingly 
difficult with the rollout of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) deployments as current 
points of interconnection such as the main distribution frames (MDF) or the 
street cabinets become obsolete and are phased out. In the case of FTTH, 
investments by competitors to interconnect physical access points in the 
local loop could ultimately be stranded. However, independent of the 
regulatory option chosen, access regulation should be applied symmetrically 
to all access networks in the market in order to to create a level playing field 
(CRANDALL et al., 2002).  
Structural separation, i.e., the virtual or physical division of monopolistic 
and competitive segments of a vertically integrated monopolist, reduces 
incentives for price and non-price discrimination and eases regulatory 
control. Thus, separation supplements access regulation though the 
disintegration of the monopolist and the introduction of a "bright line of 
equivalence" that ensures equal treatment of access seekers. CAVE (2006)  
defines six degrees of separation, from accounting to legal separation. We 
argued that NGNs technologically reduce economies of scope between 
infrastructure and services. Thus, structural separation becomes less costly 
as technical synergy losses from the separation of access networks are 
mitigated.  
We conclude from this brief analysis that the two "extreme" options, 
deregulation and separation, bear a high risk and have a limited scope of 
application: the former is particularly suited to cases of competition between 
multiple, equally capable networks, and the latter to cases of low 
infrastructure competition and a high risk of non-price discrimination. Access 
regulation is a flexible instrument that can be attuned to a wide range of 
cases as it protects downstream competition but also includes mechanisms 
to facilitate investment.   
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  Case studies on the regulation  
of access networks in NGN 
Incumbents in most OECD countries have announced plans for the 
migration to NGNs, and pioneering incumbent network operators have 
begun to move their networks towards NGNs. First regulatory reactions 
provide early evidence of access network regulation regimes in NGNs.  
Table 1 – Summary of case studies 
 Technological 
Development  
Market Structure  Regulatory Reaction Evaluation 
UK Migration of Core 
Network to NGN 
(21CN) until 2011 
BT is dominant firm in 
broadband market 
Medium infrastructure 
competition (cable 
provider, virgin media 
reaches 45% of the 
households)  
Functional 
separation of access 
networks and some 
backhaul networks 
from BT (openreach) 
Threat of ownership 
unbundling 
Strong regulation to 
protect service 
competitors against 
discriminatory 
behavior 
Little investment in 
optical infrastructures 
 
NL Migration of the 
complete network 
to All-IP and 
countrywide 
deployment of fiber 
until 2010 
KPN is dominant 
telephony provider 
Strong infrastructure 
competition between 
KPN and the cable 
providers, which reach 
94% of households) 
Access regulation 
demanding a "fully 
fledged alternative" 
to the current LLU 
 
 Access regulation 
despite  strong 
infrastructure 
competition protects 
service competitors  
Sub-loop unbundling 
will phase out with 
FTTH deployment  
Kr Migration to 
broadband 
converged network 
and rollout of 50-
100Mbps access 
networks 
nationwide 
KT is dominant 
broadband provider 
(52%) 
High infrastructure 
competition through DSL 
and cable networks  
Proactive state 
intervention drives 
sector development 
Symmetric access 
regulation 
Regulator selects 
and promotes 
technologies (picking 
winners) 
High broadband 
penetration rate and 
advanced networks  
US Advanced state of 
migration to ALL-IP 
networks and 
deployment of 
FTTx  
Three integrated 
telephony providers with 
geographically separated 
access networks 
High  infrastructure 
competition through 
cable  
Information services 
(including 
broadband) are 
deregulated  
Regulatory focus on 
promotion of 
investment 
Regulation lacks a 
transparent 
framework 
 
Many national regulators are at an early stage of the regulatory process 
but a survey on a number of OECD countries shows that the regulatory 
discussion centers on three regulatory models for high-speed networks: (1) 
access holidays or deregulation, e.g., in the USA and Germany, (2) access 
regulation, e.g., in the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and 
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Belgium, and (3) structural separation, e.g., in the UK, Australia, and 
possibly Italy (European Commission, 2007; ERG, 2007b; OECD, 2005). 
The DSL networks in all these countries except the USA, are subject to 
access regulation. We chose four case studies that exemplify the different 
regulatory regimes, i.e., UK for structural separation, the Netherlands and 
the Republic of Korea for access regulation, and the USA for deregulation. 
For these countries, we analyze the structure of access network regulation 
and the technological and competitive arguments for this system. Finally, we 
evaluate the regulatory reactions against our theoretical considerations. The 
results, summarized in Table 1, show that regulators in the UK and the 
Netherlands take a sceptical view of competitive development under NGNs, 
in contrast to the USA, where the FCC has granted access holidays for 
FTTH deployment. The Republic of Korea also promotes investment through 
state funding in a regulated environment. However, our analysis only 
provides early evidence since experience with the respective regimes is still 
limited. 
Structural separation - The Case of the UK 
British Telecom (BT) is one of the European pioneers of the Next 
Generation Network area. With the migration of its network to NGN (21 
Century Network), BT expects savings in operating expenses of £1bn  
(about 1.5bn €) starting 2008/09. The expected investment amounts to 
£ 10bn (about 15bn €). BT focuses on the migration of its core network 
without the deployment of FTTx (NERA, 2007). The core network migration 
affects only the interconnection points at the edge of the access network as 
the network hierarchy becomes flatter (Ofcom, 2004, p. 88). Since the 
geographic structure of BT's network remains unchanged, the overall effects 
on competitors' networks are limited. The UK telecommunication market is 
characterized by strong service competition but limited infrastructure 
competition in the wholesale broadband market. DSL is the dominant access 
technology with a share of 70% while cable TV has a market share of 30%, 
and the cable network operator Virgin Media reaches about 45% of British 
households (Ofcom, 2006).  
Regulation of BT's 21st Century network 
Ofcom bases its regulation on principles aimed at providing clarity and 
transparency for the future regulatory regime (Ofcom, 2005b). These 
principles include promoting competition at the deepest level of infrastructure 
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that is both economically feasible and sustainable, delivering equality of 
access beyond this level, and facilitating market entry to remove bottlenecks. 
Regulation is to be withdrawn where the competitive conditions allow 
(Ofcom, 2005a, p. 18). In the absence of strong infrastructure competition, 
Ofcom discussed the options of continuing access regulation or taking 
structural measures to secure a level playing field through equal access 
(Ofcom, 2005a, p. 29).  
Besides information asymmetries hampering regulatory price control, 
Ofcom cites non-price discrimination, i.e., the provision of lower-quality 
inputs to BT's competitors on the retail market, as a major problem (Ofcom, 
2005c, Annex F, p. 70). Ofcom concludes that even with regulatory 
safeguards in place, access regulation has not succeeded in solving the 
problems of bottlenecks and discriminatory behavior over the last 20 years. 
CAVE et al. (2006) support this view as they find factors increasing the 
incentives to discriminate in the case of BT's fixed telephone services. 
These factors are tight upstream regulation of the access network, imperfect 
competition on the downstream retail market, high substitutability on the 
downstream market, and downstream economies of scale.  
Ofcom decided to introduce a "bright line" along which the equivalence of 
input can be controlled. In June 2005, BT proposed an alternative approach 
to the Enterprise Act 2002 in which the company agreed on an 
organizational separation between its upstream non-access division 
including retail, wholesale, and global services, and its downstream access 
network and backhaul division. The separation of the access network 
division is institutionalized by a physical separation of resources, e.g., 
separate company premises, separate management, a brand name 
("openreach"), and a "Code of Practice" that regulates the interaction 
between BT and openreach employees (Ofcom, 2005a, p. 90). An "Equality 
of Access Board" (EAB) was established to monitor compliance with these 
non-discrimination regulations, as openreach remains part of the BT Group. 
In the case of BT's failure to comply with the non-discrimination regulations, 
Ofcom can request market investigation by the Competition Commission 
under Section 131 of the Act (Ofcom, 2005c, p. 3).  
Evaluation 
CAVE (2006) notes that structural measures are a viable regulatory 
solution  when the costs of discrimination exceed the costs of implementing 
these measures, especially in markets with low infrastructure competition. 
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The functional separation of BT's access division "openreach" creates 
transparency and decreases openreach's incentives to discriminate against 
competitors on the downstream retail market. BT's compliance with non-
discrimination rules is enforced by the threat of ownership unbundling by the 
Competition Commission under the Enterprise Act 2002. Recent market 
analyses show that the number of unbundled local loops has increased 
since 2005, supported by reduced access prices. Critics argue that BT is 
implementing these measures too slowly and that the numerous exemptions 
granted by Ofcom are diminishing the potential positive effects. Furthermore, 
Ofcom sees the need to promote investments in high-speed access 
networks and has launched consultations to clarify the necessary regulatory 
environment (Ofcom, 2007).  
Access regulation – The case of the Netherlands 
In 2005, the Dutch incumbent Koniklijke PTT Nederland (KPN) 
announced the migration of its network to an All-IP network and a 
countrywide deployment of geographically optimized FTTx access networks 
and phase-out of MDF and PSTN/ISDN services until 2010. KPN expects a 
reduction in operating costs of €850 million up to 2009 while the total capital 
expenses for the migration are estimated to be €0.9 billion. The extension of 
fiber to the street cabinets renders the MDFs obsolete. About 200 of the 
1,391 MDF locations will  remain in operation as interconnection points to 
the backbone (HENDRIKS, 2007, OPTA, 2006b). KPN expects an additional 
revenue of €1 billion from sales of the MDF real estate. The Dutch 
broadband market is characterized by two full-scale network platforms, DSL 
and cable TV, which each reach over 94% of Dutch households and split the 
market (60% DSL and 39% cable broadband connections). KPN is dominant 
in the DSL retail market with a share of 80%, while the remaining 20% are 
provided by the largest alternative operators BBned, Tele2/Versatel and 
Orange/Wandoo. 
Regulation of KPN's All-IP Network 
Despite the high level of infrastructure competition between DSL and 
cable TV, the Dutch national regulatory authority for telecom and postal 
services (OPTA) reasons that even in the absence of tactial collusion, two 
infrastructure platforms form an oligopoly that is likely to lead to cournot 
prices (OPTA, 2006a). However, structural separation of the access network 
following the British example is less promising because of the high level of 
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infrastructure competition between DSL and cable, and because OPTA as 
well as the Dutch competition commission lack the legal power to threaten 
ownership unbundling in the case of discriminatory behavior (NERA, 2007).  
Consequently, OPTA decided to maintain access regulation. However, 
the extension of fiber to the street cabinets renders the current 
interconnection points obsolete. Therefore, OPTA demanded that KPN 
provide a fully-fledged alternative to the unbundled access at the MDF. KPN 
proposed Sub-Loop Unbundling (SLU), i.e., access at the street cabinet, and 
Wholesale Broadband Access (WBA), i.e., virtual bitstream access, as 
options to connect to the new access network. These options were regarded 
as imperfect substitutes for MDF access. SLU requires competitors to 
expand their network to the street cabinets, which is only feasible in densely 
populated areas. Further, such investments bear the risk of being stranded if 
KPN extends the optical network to the homes, entailing the phase-out of 
street cabinets. In the case of WBA, interconnection usually takes place at a 
core network switch. Thus, WBA is a step downward on the ladder of 
investment as it increases competitors' dependency on KPN's infrastructure, 
e.g., backhaul to the point of interconnection is part of the offer. KPN entered 
negotiations with its MDF customers and reached an agreement on 
conditions for MDF phase-out, whereas KPN will phase out only those MDFs 
by 2009 for which there is no competitive access seeker. Further, KPN 
continues to offer access to the approximately 180 MDF locations used as 
metro nodes based on a reference offer, and lines that interconnect at 
locations to be dismantled are being migrated to either SLU or WBA (KPN, 
2007).  
Evaluation 
In the Dutch case, the speed of the incumbent's network migration is 
particularly striking. KPN plans to migrate its entire network to ALL-IP and 
deploy fiber in its access network in only four years, primarily financed 
through real estate sales of MDF locations. Despite the competition between 
two infrastructures, OPTA sees a need for access regulation to KPNs 
network. The definition of an access regulation regime ensures competitive 
access to KPN's bottleneck facilities at regulated rates. However, the long-
term option of SLU is not convincing, as street cabinets are likely to be 
phased out with the introduction of fiber to the FTTH networks.  
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Access regulation and a proactive public policy 
The case of the Republic of Korea  
In 2004, the Korean government launched "IT839", the nation's third 
consecutive national information infrastructure program with the goal of 
developing a "ubiquitous" network society. One cornerstone of the US$70 
billion IT839 project is the development of a fully converged NGN, the so-
called "Broadband converged Network" (BcN) (REYNOLDS et al., 2005; 
LEE et al., 2007). The incumbent KT plans - in line with IT839 - to connect 
20 million subscribers to 50-100Mbps broadband over a seamlessly 
integrated wireless (WLAN, Wireless Broadband) and fixed-line FTTH 
services by 2010. Korea was the world's leading country in broadband 
development up to 2005, and still enjoys the fourth highest broadband 
penetration rate within the OECD (OECD, 2007). Its telecommunication 
sector is characterized by strong infrastructure competition in the wireline as 
well as the advanced wireless sector. KT is the leading broadband provider 
with a market share of 52%, followed by Hanaro Telecom, which operates 
both a DSL and a cable TV network, with 30% (NCA, 2006).  
Broadband converged Network Regulation and Government Support 
The Korean telecommunications sector is administered by the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC). The telecommunications policy is 
based on government-sector development programs intended to promote 
Korea's economic growth as well as symmetrical access regulation. The 
political strategy behind the development programs relies on "picking" 
winners by financially supporting specific infrastructures but also creating 
additional demand for these infrastructures (REYNOLDS et al., 2005). Korea 
has a history of four consecutive national information infrastructure projects, 
the National Basic Information System (1987-1991), the Korean Information 
Infrastructure (1993-2000), IT839 (2004-2006), and u-IT839 (starting 2006). 
All these projects were carried out in close partnership between the public 
and the private sector including the incumbent as well as competitors. The 
Korean Information Infrastructure-Government project (KII-G) is an example 
of the government's course of action. The initial funding of US$1 billion was 
provided by the government who also became the main tenant on the 
network to create additional demand. Furthermore, about 10 million Koreans 
were trained in the use of IT. Thus, the government acted as a major driver 
for the development of the country's communication network on both the 
supply and the demand side. 
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Besides the national development projects, the regulation of access 
networks facilitates competition on the service market. The 
Telecommunications Business Act distinguishes among facility-based, 
specific, and value-added telecommunications providers, whereas the 
former group is comprised of any network (DSL, cable TV, etc.) that offers 
telecommunication services. These facility-based network operators are 
subject to symmetric open access requirements for bottleneck facilities. 
Furthermore, wireline infrastructure competition is supported by the 
communication infrastructure of large apartment complexes, which enable 
operators to connect at central main distribution frames. Hanaro Telecom, 
for example, has succeeded in building a parallel fiber network that connects 
apartment blocks with more than 200 potential customers (REYNOLDS et 
al., 2005).   
Evaluation 
The Korean government has adopted a very pro-active approach to IT-
policy and regulation that one could almost characterize as "strategic 
planning." The government selects suitable technologies and shapes the 
institutions and markets to promote their development. In contrast to the 
Netherlands, the Korean state is the main driver of NGN deployment. Today, 
Korea has one of the world's most technologically advanced networks, a 
very high level of broadband penetration, and infrastructure competition in 
many access markets. However, the interventionist approach is sometimes 
criticized because the government generally lacks sufficient information and 
incentives to decide on suitable technologies.  
Deregulation – The case of the USA  
In the USA, the migration to IP networks is considered a continuous 
network evolution rather than a radical innovation (as with NGNs in Europe), 
and began well ahead of European migration; in fact, the USA leapfrogged 
the ISDN network evolution altogether. Although the new US networks 
comprise NGN components such as the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) as 
a service delivery platform, the term Next Generation Network is not used in 
the USA.  AT&T and Verizon have largely switched their networks to All-IP 
and have begun to roll out fiber access networks, whereas AT&T deploys 
fiber-to-the-curb or premise (currently reaching about 5.5 million homes) 
while Verizon deploys fiber-to-the-home (currently reaching about 6.5 million 
homes).In the US broadband market, cable TV was the forerunner and 
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dominant infrastructure while DSL followed. Cable TV network operators 
have a footprint of over 80% of the US households and a share of 44% in 
the broadband market (FCC, 2007). The telephony access market is shared 
by three large companies, AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest, whereas competitive 
local exchange carriers provide about 17% of access networks. As the 
telephony companies traditionally operate in geographically distinct markets, 
most areas are governed by access network duopolies. 
Regulation of "Information Services" 
The US employs a vertical regulatory model that classifies infrastructure 
along the classical "stove-pipes". This categorization by media types leads 
to the dichotomie between telecommunication services, i.e. common carrier 
services, and information services, i.e. provision and management of 
information via telecommunications. While the former are subject to 
regulation, the latter, which include broadband access, are substantially 
unregulated (FRIEDEN, 2003). However, this vertical regulatory model 
becomes increasingly difficult to uphold in converging networks, as e.g. DSL 
integrates telecommunications and information services. Based on this 
argument, DSL was declared an information service in 2005 and set on 
equal footage with cable TV and promotes technology neutral regulation 
(FCC, 2005). A main argument for this ruling, as well as for the granting of 
regulatory holidays for fiber to the home and to the premise was the FCCs 
goal to promote infrastructure investment (FCC, 2003, 2004). 
Evaluation 
The results of this approach are mixed. Companies such as AT&T and 
Verizon have begun to deploy fiber to the local loop, either to the curb or to 
the home. The broadband availability and penetration is high, compared to 
the G7 states and the entry price level for DSL is low. However, fiber 
investment rates are moderate and it is possible, that the US is on the way 
to a less competitive environment than Europe and that so far, the industry 
structure may have mitigated negative effects (MARCUS, 2005). Further, 
Marcus notes that the vertical regulation lacks technological neutrality and a 
rigorous framework for economic analysis. 
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  Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the need and options for the regulation of 
access networks in NGN and provided early case study evidence on the 
regulation of the evolving networks. We argue from a technical perspective 
that multiple parallel infrastructures of the same technology are unlikely 
because of scale economies, and that high-speed networks may exhibit a 
competitive advantage over lower-speed networks because of vertical 
product differentiation. Further, we suggest two market scenarios for access 
networks that may result from convergence: either a single market 
containing all access networks, or two markets, one for "normal" bandwidth 
and one for "high" bandwidth, whereas we conclude that market failure is 
likely to prevail in all markets that include high bandwidth networks. We 
observed a wide range of regulatory trajectories in different countries, 
gravitating towards three models: unregulated competition, access 
regulation, and structural separation. The relation between technical market 
conditions, e.g., the degree of infrastructure competition, is shown by the 
case studies on the "dense" IT countries, the Netherlands and Korea. 
Furthermore, we showed that regulators take different stances on promoting 
incumbents' access network investments and on protecting competition, as 
seen in the different regimes in the Netherlands and the USA. We conclude 
that NGN access networks still need regulatory oversight with instruments 
against price and non-price discrimination. These instruments need to be 
handled deliberately to support efficient investment. Ex ante access 
regulation may be attuned to a wide range of cases. Structural separation 
can supplement access regulation where the potential for infrastructure 
competition is low. Deregulation may be appropriate under high 
infrastructure competition among multiple, equally capable infrastructures. 
While our approach provides early and specific case study evidence, further 
empirical research is needed extending the sample to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of regulatory reactions, e.g. their relation to structural 
variables such as population density and urbanization and to understand the 
success of the different regulatory regimes in the evolving NGN world. 
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